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Abstract
Excessive labor turnover may be considered, to a great extent, an undesirable feature of
a given economy. This follows from considerations such as underinvestment in human
capital by ﬁrms. Understanding the determinants and the evolution of turnover in a
particular labor market is therefore of paramount importance, including policy consider-
ations. The present paper proposes an econometric analysis of turnover in the Brazilian
labor market, based on a partial observability bivariate probit model. This model consid-
ers the interdependence of decisions taken by workers and ﬁrms, helping to elucidate the
causes that lead each of them to end an employment relationship. The Employment and
Unemployment Survey (PED) conducted by the State System of Data Analysis (SEADE)
and by the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE)
provides data at the individual worker level, allowing for the estimation of the joint prob-
abilities of decisions to quit or stay on the job on the worker’s side, and to maintain or
ﬁre the employee on the ﬁrm’s side, during a given time period. The estimated param-
eters relate these estimated probabilities to the characteristics of workers, job contracts,
and to the potential macroeconomic determinants in diﬀerent time periods. The results
conﬁrm the theoretical prediction that the probability of termination of an employment
relationship tends to be smaller as the worker acquires speciﬁc skills. The results also
show that the establishment of a formal employment relationship reduces the probabil-
ity of a quit decision by the worker, and also the ﬁrm’s ﬁring decision in non-industrial
sectors. With regard to the evolution of quit probability over time, the results show that
an increase in the unemployment rate inhibits quitting, although this tends to wane as
the unemployment rate rises.
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1. Introduction
The present paper provides an empirical analysis of quit and dismissal deter-
minants. Therefore, it sheds some light on the determinants for labor turnover
and its evolution in the analyzed time period (1988-1999).
The high labor turnover observed in Brazil1 is impressive and encourages the
development of empirical studies, such as those by Barros et al. (1999b), Bar-
ros et al. (1999a), Corseuil et al. (2002) and Gonzaga (2003). The latter study
is an in-depth discussion about the Brazilian employment protection legislation
and the eﬀectiveness of its incentive mechanisms in the reallocation of workers.
This study contributes to the existing debate over the causes of excessive labor
turnover in Brazil, having as major contribution the distinct analysis of quits and
dismissals, based on the information given by workers about whose initiative it
was to terminate the employment contract. This analysis was possible thanks to
the information obtained from PED/SEADE/DIEESE. In this context, we also
sought to investigate the eﬀect of changes in the Brazilian labor market regulation
– implemented in November 1988 by the new Constitution2 – on the probabilities
of quits and dismissals.
PED (Employment and Unemployment Survey) data were collected at the in-
dividual level, which allowed for the correlation test through a cross-sectional
analysis, using the information available about each individual and his jobs. Such
tests were performed using the estimation of a bivariate probit model with partial
observability. The proposed estimation procedure is based on the joint model-
ing of the utility maximizing behavior, involving both ﬁrms and employees. The
econometric model and the data are described in Sections 1 and 2, respectively.
Section 3 describes each covariate used for the estimations, and discusses their
inclusion based on the economic theory. This is done for the characteristics of
workers and ﬁrms (and of the job contract as well), and for the variables that
indicate changes in the macroeconomic environment. This includes a discussion
about the possible eﬀects produced by a change in the employment protection
legislation on the probabilities of quits and dismissals.
Section 4 shows the results obtained with the econometric tests. The results
were stratiﬁed according to sectors of economic activity, which enables the com-
parison between the statistically signiﬁcant variables for the determination of quit
and dismissal probabilities in each sector.
The last section concludes.
1A manifestation of high turnover would be the large percentage of workers who do not stay
on their jobs for two years. Considering only those workers with a formal job contract, the
average of this percentage in Brazil amounted to 48.6% between 1990 and 2000, according to the
data available from the Annual Records of Social Information (RAIS).
2The changes implemented by the new constitution increased variable labor costs as well as
layoﬀ costs for the ﬁrms, since the penalty for unfair dismissal went from 10% of the amount
accumulated in the FGTS (seniority severance payment fund) account, to approximately 40%.
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2. Proposal for the Empirical Study: The Bivariate Probit Model
Poirier (1980) regards the bivariate probit model as ideal to analyze situations
in which two agents have to individually make a binary choice, and these choices are
correlated with each other. For instance, the author presents a situation analyzed
by Gunderson (1974), in which the probability of a trainee being hired by the
ﬁrm which provided the training course was estimated. In this situation, after the
training period, the ﬁrm should decide whether it would hire the trainee. And the
trainee should decide whether he wants to be hired by the ﬁrm.
The problem we want to analyze in this study is quite similar to the “trainee
case” presented by Gunderson (1974) and Poirier (1980). In this study, employees
are observed during a given month of the sample period, and then observed again
one year later. In the second observation, the employment relationship may have
been maintained or broken by any of the parties, or even broken by both parties.
Thus, the idea is that over one year of observation, the ﬁrm should decide whether
it would maintain the employment relationship. The employee, in his turn, should
decide whether to quit or not. Just like in the trainee case, these decisions are
correlated.
As Poirier (1980) puts it, the modeling of this situation becomes clearer after
placing the problem in an analytical framework in which the two decision-making
agents maximize their utility functions.
The ﬁrm’s binary choice is represented by yf = 0,1 (where 1 refers to the
maintenance of the employment relationship and 0 refers to the dismissal of an
employee); whereas the employee’s choice is represented by ye = 0,1 (where 1 refers
to the decision to keep the job and 0 refers to his decision to quit). As previously
mentioned, these decisions concern a one-year period. Considering vector W, with
ﬁxed observable characteristics of each ﬁrm, each employee and each employment
relationship, we assume utility functions of the form:
Uf0 = gf0 (W,y∗
e) + ηf0 (1)
Uf1 = gf1 (W,y
∗
e) + ηf1
for the two possible choices made by the ﬁrm. Analogously, employees presumably













where, for j = f,e and i = 0,1, we have that: gji are deterministic functions; ηji
are unobservable random factors; and each y∗j is equal to (Uj1−Uj0), representing
the “tendency” of agent j towards choice yj = 1, or the “preference” of agent j.
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It should be noted that these functions involve an important hypothesis. This
hypothesis posits that the utility an agent attributes to each of his options de-
pends on the other agent’s “preference.” This means that the model deals with
the hypothesis that each agent perceives, at least in part, the other agent’s “pref-
erence,” and this inﬂuences his own decision. This hypothesis is supported by
lines of research discussed in Section 3, as they show that each agent involved in
an employment relationship needs to guarantee that the other party is also com-
mitted. Regardless of theoretical developments, we must say that this idea is quite
intuitive. As Ehrenberg and Smith (1994, pg. 340) put it “While we may talk of a
quit as “worker-initiated,” the fact that an employer did not choose to take steps
to retain potential quitters would seem to imply that the employer believed keeping
them was not worth the cost.”
Following Poirier (1980), we assume that:
gf1 (W,y
∗

















ηf1 − ηf0 = ǫf
ηe1 − ηe0 = ǫe
where X is a covariate vector; δf δe, are vectors of unknown parameters; γf, γe,




















f + Xδe + ǫe
which, according to the hypothesis of stochastic utility maximization, means that
agent j will choose option 1 if y∗
j > 0. That is, yj = 1 if Uj1 > Uj0 , for j = f,e.
Deﬁning:
βe = (1 − γfγe)
−1 (δe − γeδf)
βf = (1 − γfγe)
−1 (δf − γf − δe)
νe = (1 − γfγe)
−1 )ǫe − γeǫf)
we ﬁnally have the following reduced-form equations:




e = Xβe + νe (5)
y∗
f = Xβf + νf
Thus, two facts allow the interdependence of utility functions of the two indi-
viduals. The ﬁrst one, which was previously mentioned, is that the utility of each
individual is speciﬁed as being dependent upon the other individual’s “tendency.”
The second one is that both unobservable stochastic components are potentially
correlated.
Then, even though equations(5) correspond to two separate univariate discrete-
choice models, they can beneﬁt from joint estimation, which shows that the bivari-
ate model is the most appropriate. This results directly from higher asymptotic
eﬃciency in a context of maximum likelihood estimation, in the case in which
wfe,wef and ρ are diﬀerent from zero.
Assuming the standard bivariate normal distribution as the “link” function,






+ yif(1 − yie(1 − yie1n[φ(Xiβf) − F(Xiβf,Xiβe,ρ)]
+ (1 − yif)yie1n(φ(Xiβe) − F(Xiβf,Xiβe,ρ)]
+ (1 − yif)(1 − yie{1n[ρ(Xi,βf) − F(Xiβf,Xiβe,Xi,ρ)]
+ (1 − yif)(1 − yie{1n[φ(Xiβf) − F(Xiβf,Xiβe,ρ)]
+ 1n[φ(Xiβe) − F(Xi,βf,Xi,βe,ρ)]}
where φ(.) is the standard univariate normal distribution, and N stands for the
sample size.
The likelihood function shown above presupposes that there is enough informa-
tion to distinguish each of the four possible combinations of decisions made by the
ﬁrm and by the employee (“keep/stay,” “keep/quit,” “ﬁre/stay,” and “ﬁre/quit”).
However, this is not an appropriate hypothesis to deal with the speciﬁc situation to
be faced in this study. As will be discussed in the next section (data description),
the only combination of decisions we can guarantee from the available observation
is that in which both the employee and the employer jointly decide to maintain
the employment relationship (“keep/stay”), which is directly observed when the
employee keeps the same job after one year.
When the employee does not hold the same job after one year, he informs us
whether he quit or was ﬁred. However, if he, for instance, informs us that he quit,
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we cannot be sure of what the ﬁrm’s decisions would have been by the end of
one year. Analogously, if the employee informs us that he was ﬁred, we cannot
be sure of what this employee’s decision would have been by the end of one year.
The dismissal by the employer might have occurred after a period in which the
employee neglected his duties, perhaps while he was looking for another job.
In the speciﬁc case of the Brazilian labor market, the labor legislation encour-
ages workers to strike a deal with ﬁrms, in which case, if they decide to quit, they
ask to be formally dismissed (unfair dismissal); thus they are entitled to withdraw
the balance of the FGTS account (Seniority Severance Payment Fund account).
This casts further doubt on the answer “I was ﬁred” as an actual representation
of the employer’s decision.
These considerations support the estimation of the partial observability bivari-
ate probit model of Poirier (1980), in which, instead of observing Xi, yfi and yei,
i = 1,2,...,N, we observe Xi and zi, i = 1,2,...,N, where
zi = 1 if yfi = yei = 1 (6)
zi = 0 in other cases
This means that from the four possible combinations of decisions made by the
employee and the ﬁrm – “keep/stay,” “keep/quit,” “ﬁre/stay” and “ﬁre/quit” – it
is possible to distinguish only the second one from the other three. In this context,
the two equations necessarily have to be jointly estimated, given the arguments of




{zi,lnF(Xiβf,Xiβe,ρ) + (1 − zi)1n[1 − F(Xiβf,Xiβe,ρ)]}
It results directly from the distribution of zi, which is given by:
Pr(zi = 1) = pi = Pr(yfi = 1 and yei = 1) = F(Xiβf,Xiβe,ρ) (7)
Pr(zi = 0) = 1 − pi = Pr(yfi = 0 and/or yei = 0) = 1 − F(Xiβf,Xiβe,ρ)
If parameters βf and βe are identiﬁed, we may estimate the four diﬀerent
probabilities regarding the four possible combinations of decisions made by the ﬁrm
and by the employee, using reduced-form equations. A suﬃcient condition for local
identiﬁcation is that the information matrix of the log-likelihood function above
is non-singular (Rothenberg, 1971). This condition, however, does not guarantee
global identiﬁcation.
The solution employed to deal with the lack of global identiﬁcation was to
make two estimations: one that supposed full observability and another one that
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assumed the partial observability described above. In case of full observability, two
additional suppositions were necessary to estimate the model: (i) that the answers
given by unemployed individuals about the dismissal initiative are perfectly true
and (ii) that when one of the parties decides to end the employment relationship,
the other party would have wanted to maintain it. Given these suppositions, we
never have the “ﬁre/quit” combination.
The importance of estimating the model by supposing full observability is that
the estimated coeﬃcients could be used as initial values for the estimation of
the partial observability model. This procedure facilitates the convergence of the
partial observability model to the correct equilibrium point.
Another important aspect to be considered regarding partial observability is
the loss of eﬃciency in the estimation. Meng and Schmidt (1985) present some
simulation results that conﬁrm the intuitive notion that the larger the proportion
of values 1 assumed by variable z in the sample, the lower the cost of partial
observability in terms of loss of eﬃciency. Since, in our case, this corresponds to
the proportion of employees that kept the same job for one year, it is encouraging
to note that this proportion is relatively high in our sample.
3. Data
The sample consists of data obtained at the individual worker level by the
Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED). PED has been carried out every
month by the SEADE and DIEESE foundations, since 1984. These databases
are used to construct a monthly unemployment rate, among other aggregate in-
dicators. Information from January 1985 to December 1999 are available. Ev-
ery month, approximately 3,000 randomly selected families are interviewed in the
metropolitan region of S˜ ao Paulo (RMSP). Each individual is interviewed only
once, diﬀerently from the rotating panel design that characterizes the PME/IBGE
survey. However, PED has a great advantage over the PME: it contains informa-
tion about job tenure, both about those workers who were employed at the moment
of the interview and about the previous job for those who were unemployed at the
time of the interview.
The information about the previous job tenure of those who were unemployed
at the time of the interview is only available from February 1988 onwards. For
this reason, the econometric estimations cover the period from February 1988 to
December 1999.
The sample used in this study consists of individuals who, at the time of the
interview, were employed in the same ﬁrm for at least one year, also including the
individuals who had been unemployed for less than one year at the time of the
interview. Individuals aged less than 10 years, domestic and public sector workers
were excluded from the original sample.
Considering the whole sample, we observe that approximately 90% of workers
were employed. The 10% unemployment rate in our sample underestimates the
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mean rate for the analyzed period. This is explained by the fact that the selected
sample included only workers who had been unemployed for less than one year.
The mean age in the sample is 33 years, 64% are males, 48% are household
heads, approximately 40% are formal employees (with a job contract) and the
average worker completed 4 years of formal education.3
As expected, the number of terminated employment relationships observed
every year tends to be larger in periods in which the unemployment rate rises
(table 1).
Table 1
YEAR Evolution of the Open Variation of the






1989 2,683 6.59 -6.1%
1990 3,901 7.21 9.4%
1991 4,545 7.92 9.8%
1992 4,436 9.13 15.3%
1993 3,677 8.68 -4.9%
1994 3,353 8.92 2.8%
1995 3,819 8.95 0.3%
1996 3,805 9.93 10.95%
1997 4,309 10.16 2.32%
1998 4,599 11.67 14.9%
1999 2,576 12.06 3.3%
Source: PED/SEADE-DIESE
(
∗) 1 – The number of terminated employment relationships observed every year does not correspond
to the total number of terminated employment relationships associated with the interviewed workers,
since, for every interviewed worker, we observe at most one terminated employment relationship every
year. 2 – the sample size of PED did not change over the study period.
In addition, table 2 shows the evolution of the number of quits (%) relatively
to the total number of employment relationships terminated every year. This
percentage tends to be larger in the years in which the level of employment in the
metropolitan region of S˜ ao Paulo was relatively higher.
3One should underscore that the information available from PED regarding the years of
formal study is incomplete. The maximum number of study years corresponds to nine, and it
is associated with all those who ﬁnished high school, also including those with a college degree.
So, it is not possible to distinguish between those who ﬁnished high school and have a college
degree from those who do not have it.
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Table 2
YEAR Quits/total number of Percentage of employed
terminated employment workers in PEA
relationships (economically active













Table 2 shows a clearly positive relation between the proportion of quits ev-
ery year (relatively to the total number of terminated employment relationships)
and the level of employment in the RMSP. In the analyzed period, the level of
employment in the RMSP fell nearly continuously. More precisely, this level: (i)
was quite high until 1989; (ii) fell until 1992; (iii) slightly increased in 1993, being
stable until 1995; and ﬁnally, (iv) fell again until 1999. The proportion of quits
follows the same tendency.
4. Covariates
Before discussing the explanatory variables used for the estimations, we should
underscore that one of the major determinants for the possible termination of an
employment relationship is the amount of speciﬁc training oﬀered to the worker
– deﬁned as the type of training that increases the worker’s productivity only in
the ﬁrm where the training took place. This relation was originally pointed out
by Becker (1962), who drew attention to the fact that the investment costs and
returns regarding speciﬁc training should be shared between the employee and the
employer so as to guarantee the continuity of the employment relationship for both
parties.4 Becker concluded that there is an inverse relation between investment in
speciﬁc training and the probability of termination of an employment relationship.
4However, such cost sharing is not simple, so experts in institutional economy developed
theories about contract and organizational arrangements that resulted from the necessity of
sharing costs. Given the diﬃculty in establishing this kind of arrangement, part of the literature
assumes that speciﬁc training is exclusively paid by the ﬁrm - especially the literature whose
focus lies on the eﬀects of ﬁxed labor costs on labor demand.
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Subsequent empirical studies showed that there is a positive correlation be-
tween general and speciﬁc training.5 This produces signiﬁcant diﬀerences among
ﬁrms regarding the average probability of termination of employment relation-
ships, since ﬁrms use diﬀerent technologies of production, which are quite distinct
in terms of the average amount of training required from workers. However, the
database used in this study contains scarce information about the ﬁrms.
The solution was to divide the sample into ﬁve sectors – making ﬁve separate
estimations.6 The diﬀerent sectors of economic activity diﬀer in terms of the
adopted technologies of production, which, in their turn, make them diﬀerent in
relation to the average ﬁrm size, to the average amount of training required from
workers, and to the average speciﬁcity of skills required from workers. The division
of the sample into ﬁve sectors allows the characteristics of the ﬁrms to be more
homogeneous in the subsamples.7
Sector 1 includes large industrial companies characterized by a more intensive
use of capital.8 Sector 2 includes smaller and less capital-intensive industries
(textile sector, furniture sector, etc...). Finally, sectors 3, 4 and 5 correspond
respectively to civil construction, commerce and services.
Table 3 shows the diﬀerences between these ﬁve sectors regarding the average
job tenure and the percentage of workers with a formal job contract.9
5General training is deﬁned as that which increases the worker’s productivity not only in the
ﬁrm where the training is oﬀered but also in other ﬁrms. For Becker, this type of training should
be paid by the worker. Mincer (1988) conducted an empirical study whose results indicate a
negative eﬀect of on-the-job training on turnover. For the author, this result may be explained
by the positive correlation between general and speciﬁc components of on-the-job training.
6An estimate regarding the whole sample was not included because the intercept dummy
variables are not enough to capture important diﬀerences between the sectors in the estimated
parameters. The only reason to include this estimation is the eﬃciency gain from the increase
in sample size, but this is not relevant in this study, given the size of the samples corresponding
to the sectors.
7A vast literature exists on how the characteristics of jobs and ﬁrms inﬂuence labor turnover-
including not only orthodox models, but also the developments of heterodox economic theory.
Econometric studies that assess the relationship between labor turnover and the characteristics
of the ﬁrms – such as size, technological sophistication and unionization – are quite common.
This section does not deal with this issue in detail, due to the paucity of satisfactory data to
analyze it empirically.
8According to the classiﬁcation presented by Carvalho and Feij´ o (1993), the following sectors
of processing industry are characterized by the presence of large companies, which oﬀer attrac-
tive career opportunities to their employees: metallurgy, transportation materials, paper and
cardboard, rubber, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, perfumery beverages and editorial and printing.
Orellano (1997) used this classiﬁcation to test the determinants for quits and dismissals and con-
cluded that workers in these sectors have a lower chance to quit their jobs, even if other relevant
factors, such as education, qualiﬁcation level and formal job contract, are controlled.
9Note that the samples corresponding to each sector contain individuals who were employed
in the sector at the time of the interview and individuals who had worked in the sector one
year prior to the interview. Thus, the average job tenure calculated for each sector includes the
average length of terminated employment relationships.
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Table 3




tenure 5.3 years 4.2 years 3.9 years 4,years 4.9 years
% of workers
with a formal 80.4% 60.3% 31.4% 38.0% 43.7%
job contract
Source: PED/SEADE-DIESE
Table 3 shows large diﬀerences between the ﬁve sectors regarding the percent-
age of workers with a formal job contract. Industry, in general, has a high level of
formality concerning employment relationships, followed by the service, commerce
and civil construction sectors. This diﬀerence may be due, to a great extent, to
the fact that industrial ﬁrms are usually larger in comparison with ﬁrms belonging
to other sectors, which allows these ﬁrms to be more easily monitored in terms of
legal compliance.
Also important is the diﬀerence in the level of formality between the most
capital-intensive industry and the other industrial ﬁrms, which supports the divi-
sion of industries into two large subsectors, singling out the most capital-intensive
industry. The latter one also has a clearly longer average job tenure.10 It is in-
teresting to note that the less capital-intensive industry does not diﬀer from the
commerce and service sectors with regard to the average job tenure, despite the
higher level of formality in employment relationships observed in the industry.
In all sectors, the two bivariate probit models (supposing full and partial ob-
servability) were estimated – and a set of covariates was included in all estimations.
The covariates that indicate job characteristics are concerned with the job that is
being analyzed, which we call “reference job.” For individuals who were employed
at the time of the interview, the “reference job” would be the job they held at
that time. For unemployed individuals, the “reference job” would be the last job,
which they left before the interview.
The set of covariates common to the ﬁve sectors, which will be discussed ahead,
consists of: (i) a dummy variable using number 1 to indicate female workers (gen-
der); (ii) a dummy variable using number 1 to indicate the household head (head);
(iii) age (age); (iv) worker’s tenure in the “reference job” (tenure); (v) level of for-
mal education determined by the number of school years (educ)11; (vi) a dummy
10This observation is consistent with the result obtained by Orellano (1997), according to
whom workers in the most capital-intensive sectors have a lower chance to quit their jobs, even
if other factors, such as education, qualiﬁcation level and formal job contract, are controlled.
11As mentioned in a previous note, one should recall that the maximum number of school
years is nine, and that this number is associated with all those individuals who ﬁnished high
school, including those with a college degree.
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variable using number 1 to indicate the workers who had a formal job contract
in the “reference job” (contr.); (vii) open unemployment rate (PED/SEADE-
DIEESE) published in the month in which the worker left the job, or the mean
open unemployment rate during the year in which the workers kept the same job
(open unemp); (viii) variation of (deseasonalized) sector GDP in the two months
preceding the date on which the worker left the job,12 or the monthly average of
the total sector GDP variation during one year, for workers who kept the same
job (gdpvar); (ix) a dummy variable indicating the period after November 1988,
when the new constitution made some changes to the Brazilian labor legislation,
for workers with a formal job contract and at least three months in the job (dec88);
and ﬁnally, (x) ten more dummy variables, one for each year, from 1990 to 1999.13
The discussion about the meaning and the expected eﬀect of each of these co-
variates is clearer if they are divided into two groups. The ﬁrst group consists of
variables that indicate the workers’ personal characteristics, or the speciﬁc charac-
teristics of the employment relationship being analyzed. This group includes the
ﬁrst six covariates listed above. The other group, which includes all the remain-
ing covariates, consists of variables that indicate changes in the “macroeconomic
environment” (including changes in the legislation), or changes in the sector of
economic activity analyzed.
Some empirical studies demonstrated that the probability of married men,
especially those with children, quitting their jobs is lower than that for single
men.14 The opposite occurs with women. Married women, especially those with
children, have a higher probability of quitting their jobs, due to their sporadic
absence from work to look after their children and their house.15 Therefore, the
ﬁrst two covariates included in the estimations seek to capture these eﬀects, the
ﬁrst one indicating the worker’s gender and the second one indicating the worker’s
position as “household head,” a position that can also be taken by the woman.
The variable “age” is expected to have an inverse relation with the probability
of quitting and being ﬁred. The longer the participation in the labor market
(which tends to increase with age), the longer the time this individual had to
devote himself to looking for a job and, therefore, the higher his level of satisfaction
12In case of sectors 3, 4 and 5, only quarterly GDP data were found. Thus, for the ﬁrst month
of each quarter, we associated the GDP variation observed between the two previous quarters.
For the last month of each quarter, we associated the GDP variation between the previous quarter
and the quarter corresponding to this month. For the intermediate month, we associated the
mean of these two variations.
13The dummy variable indicating a certain year (say, year X) was constructed in the following
manner. Value 1 was associated with individuals who left their jobs in that year and with
individuals who were interviewed in that year. The latter ones kept the same job at least for
twelve months between the beginning of year (X − 1) and the end of year X.
14The study conducted by Mincer (1978) is an example. The author explains this result using
the highest opportunity costs to change jobs resulting from family bonds. However, one may
argue that married men are more averse to the risk of leaving a job only to look for another one.
15See Lynch (1992:18).
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should be. This should occur not only in terms of wage, as presented in the model
developed by Burdett (1978), but also with regard to other job characteristics.
Thus, the worker’s age should have a positive correlation with the job matching
quality, reducing the probability of quitting and the probability of being ﬁred. On
top of that, the older the individual, the lower the return expected from the job
searching activity, which should also reduce the probability of quitting.
Job tenure is a way to measure the amount of speciﬁc skills acquired by an
employee. In this case, the idea is simple: the longer a worker stays on the job,
the more time he has to acquire these speciﬁc skills in relation to the ﬁrm where
he works. As discussed at the beginning of this section, this should reduce the
probability of quitting and the probability of being ﬁred.
Another variable included to measure the amount of speciﬁc skills acquired
by the worker is his level of formal education. As asserted by Mincer (1994:121),
the human capital theory supposes that individuals who achieved a higher level
of formal education tend to get a higher amount of on-the-job training – which
explains the use of the level of formal education as a way to measure the amount of
on-the-job training received by the worker.16 This theoretical result is based on the
hypotheses of persistence of investment in human capital and complementarity of
investment in human capital. The former supposes that individuals who invested
more in formal education will also invest more in training, since the same individual
factors that led them to make the ﬁrst type of investment in human capital will
also lead them to invest more in training. The second hypothesis posits that
investment in formal education allows individuals to derive more beneﬁts from
on-the-job training.
Finally, as the last covariate that indicates speciﬁc characteristics of the em-
ployment relationship, we included the dummy variable indicating that the worker
had a formal job contract (assuming value 1 for workers with a formal job con-
tract). Obviously, we expect a negative eﬀect of this variable on the probability of
dismissal by the ﬁrm, since the formal employment relationship imposes additional
dismissal costs (basically, termination notice and FGTS penalty).
Dismissal costs, as well as hiring costs and initial training costs, constitute the
ﬁxed costs (or “quasi-ﬁxed costs”) of the labor factor, as they are not proportional
to the amount of working hours each employee will devote to the ﬁrm, although
they are proportional to the number of hired employees. A vast literature exists
on the eﬀect of such costs on the dynamics of labor demand, but Oi (1962) was
the one who developed this idea. Several models were later developed,17 reaching
the same conclusion that ﬁxed labor costs reduce the oscillation in labor demand
16The use of the level of formal education as a way to measure the amount of speciﬁc skills
acquired by the worker requires the additional hypothesis that processes of job training always
have some speciﬁcity with regard to the ﬁrm where they take place – which was discussed at the
beginning of this section and is advocated by Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Mincer (1988).
17See Nickell (1978), Nickell (1986) and Nickell (1995).
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– reducing the volume of hirings in periods of growth and the volume of dismissals
in periods of recession. Thus, these models suppose that higher dismissal costs
imply lower probability of dismissal by the ﬁrms, as the employment relationships
would be on average more stable in a context with higher costs.
A priori, we also expect an inverse relation between the variable formal job
contract (which indicates the formal employment relationship) and the probability
of quitting. The fact is that the formal employment relationship oﬀers beneﬁts
to the worker (such as welfare, paid vacations, maternity leave, termination pay
in case of unfair dismissal, among others). These advantages are highly valued
by workers and, therefore, should reduce the probability of these workers quitting
their jobs. This conclusion has already been conﬁrmed by empirical tests.18
Now shifting to the group of variables that indicate changes in the “macroeco-
nomic environment” or changes in the analyzed sector, the ﬁrst one we have is open
unemployment (open unemp). The inﬂuence of this variable on the probability of
quitting is formalized in job search models such as that by Barron and McCaﬀerty
(1977), which results in a function that determines the quit rates. According to
this model, the level of labor demand is an exogenous variable that inﬂuences the
individual decision of each worker to search for a job. The rise in labor demand
increases the expected net return from the job search, then, the total number of
quits responds positively to an increase in the level of labor demand and negatively
to a reduction in this level. This generates an inverse relation between unemploy-
ment rate and the probability of quitting, which was corroborated in empirical
studies such as that carried out by Mincer (1988).19
The unemployment rate can also be viewed as a relevant variable to the deci-
sions of ﬁrms to ﬁre employees, however, should have a positive relation with the
probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm, contrary to what occurs with the probability
of quitting. The idea is that the ﬁrm, when deciding to ﬁre employees, observes
the available information about economic activity. The higher the unemployment
rate in the previous period, the higher the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm
should be.
At this point, it is important to note that the unemployment rate being as-
sociated with the workers who left their jobs (quit or ﬁred) corresponds to the
unemployment rate of the month prior to dismissal or quitting. Thus, the eﬀect
that is measured is that of the unemployment rate on the probability of ﬁring, and
not the other way round.
The variable gdpvar, in its turn, is used to measure the variation of product
demand in each sector, since a decrease in the demand for a ﬁrm’s product should
18See Orellano (1997:87).
19Mincer (1988) conducted an empirical study in which the unemployment rate is included
as explanatory variable for the mobility of each worker between ﬁrms. Unemployment inhibits
quitting because it reduces the probability of ﬁnding another job. According to the author,
unemployment inhibits quits in a larger proportion than the increase in dismissals by the ﬁrms.
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generate an adjustment of production so that this production can restore the
ﬁrm’s equilibrium (proﬁt maximization). By supposing that employers do not ﬁre
employees at the ﬁrst sign of reduction in sales, seeking ﬁrst to reduce production
by reducing the number of hired working hours, the variable gdpvar is a way to
measure the demand for the product in the previous period. Dismissals should
occur only in a second moment, after an initial reduction in production – provided
that the ﬁrm believes in the persistence of this decrease in the product demand.
The previous non-seasonal variation of production was used because the ﬁrms
expect the seasonal decreases in the demand for the product, knowing that they are
followed by recovery in the same year. Therefore, a seasonal decrease in demand
should not cause dismissals – especially when the hiring and dismissal costs are
signiﬁcant for the ﬁrms. However, if a non-seasonal decrease in the demand for the
product occurs and this decrease is seen as persistent, this may result in dismissals
after a decrease in production.
As the variable gdpvar indicates previous (non-seasonal) variations in produc-
tion, given the arguments presented in the two previous paragraphs, a reduction
in this variable (assuming sometimes negative values) is expected to increase the
probability of dismissal by the ﬁrms.
The inclusion of the variable gdpvar as explanatory variable for the probability
of quitting, follows a logic that is quite close to that used to explain the relationship
between unemployment and quitting. According to the hypotheses being used,
previous (non-seasonal) increases in the product of a sector may imply hirings
in the subsequent period. This may especially increase the probability of quits
among employees in this same sector– who have already acquired skills which,
even if not speciﬁc to the ﬁrm where they have worked, may be speciﬁc to the
sector of economic activity.
Getting on with the analysis of covariates that indicate changes in the macroe-
conomic environment, we should now discuss the expected eﬀect of the variable
dec88, which indicates the period after November 1988 (date on which changes
were made to labor legislations by the new constitution) for those workers with a
formal job contract and with at least three months on the job.20
The incentive mechanism produced by the Brazilian employment protection
legislation is quite complex. For that reason, the potential eﬀects caused by a
change in this legislation are often contradictory.
With the new Brazilian constitution, the FGTS penalty charge, which should
be compulsorily paid by the ﬁrms when they dismiss an employee without good
reason, increased from 10% to 40%. Given this increase in the dismissal cost, this
change is expected to have lowered the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm for
those workers with a formal job contract (and at least three months on the job).
On the other hand, the fact that the worker can withdraw the money paid by
20Only the employees with at least three months in the job are entitled to indemnity for
dismissal without grounds, as the ﬁrst three months in the job are regarded as probation period.
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the ﬁrm may represent an incentive for him to force his own dismissal, especially
in periods of economic growth. Dismissal would be formally seen as dismissal
without good reason, when, actually, the worker has the intention to leave the job.
The increase in the FGTS penalty charge to be paid by the ﬁrm would therefore
encourage workers to leave the job.
However, there is one factor that makes this incentive mechanism even more
complex: the worker has the right to withdraw the balance of the FGTS account
when he is ﬁred. That is, dismissal by the ﬁrm implies that the worker is entitled
to withdraw the balance of the FGTS account plus the penalty charge paid by the
ﬁrm. So, there exists the possibility that the ﬁrm and the worker will make an
agreement in cases in which the worker intends to leave the job. In this agreement,
the ﬁrm accepts to ﬁre the worker without good reason so that he can withdraw
the balance of his FGTS account, but the worker would have to give the amount
corresponding to the penalty charge back to the ﬁrm.
The increase in the FGTS penalty charge may have inhibited such agreements,
since the short-term gain earned by the worker in cases of agreement is reduced
with the increase in the FGTS penalty charge. In addition, the employer may feel
more reluctant to accept these agreements, since there is an increased risk of the
worker not returning the penalty charge paid by the ﬁrm. Given all these factors,
it is diﬃcult to accurately predict the eﬀect of the increase of the penalty charge
on the decision of workers to leave the job.
There is still another relevant change implemented by the new constitution: the
creation of the unemployment insurance for workers with a formal job contract.
According to the literature, this change encourages attitudes that lead to dismissal
by the ﬁrm, in periods of low unemployment rate. However, this eﬀect cannot be
considered a consensus among researchers, neither from the theoretical nor from
the empirical point of view.
Finally, to conclude the discussion about the set of covariates common to all
estimations, we have to explain the inclusion of dummy variables associated with
each year in the 1990-1999 period. These “year dummies” aim to control the pos-
sible eﬀects produced by other relevant macroeconomic changes, as the Brazilian
economy had important changes in the 1990-1999 period, such as stabilization
plans and the process of trade liberalization.
Only the estimations relative to the two industrial sectors include an additional
covariate – in addition to the set of covariates common to all estimations, as
previously mentioned and discussed. This covariate, herein referred to as volatile,
seeks to capture the level of uncertainty in relation to the future in each time
period. It is an indicator that measures the volatility of the level of production in
each period, which was constructed from the data on production available from
FIESP, Federation of Industries of the State of S˜ ao Paulo, based on a GARCH
model.
The expected relation between this covariate and the probabilities of quit and
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dismissal results from the hypothesis that a greater uncertainty in relation to
the future (the volatility of the level of production is considered an indicator of
uncertainty), reduces the response of ﬁrms to the previous changes observed in the
product demand. In other words, in a moment of higher volatility, an economic
setback should not cause several dismissals in the subsequent period, since ﬁrms
do not view this setback as permanent (or long-lasting). On top of that, one may
argue that, in periods of greater uncertainty, a previous economic expansion does
not result in hirings in the subsequent period- thus not inducing quits due to a
more ﬁerce competition for labor among ﬁrms. Therefore, the volatile variable is
expected to reduce quits and dismissals by the ﬁrm.
It is worth noticing that, as will be discussed in the next section, the volatility
of production in industry increased signiﬁcantly after 1994 (in addition to being
high in 1990). This increase also corresponds to a change in economy in the 1990s,
whose eﬀect will be tested.
The volatile variable was only included in the two industrial sectors for two
reasons. One reason is that this measure of production volatility was constructed
based on data about the industry provided by FIESP. The second reason is that,
in industry, turnover costs for the ﬁrms tend to be larger, given the increased
costs with training. This makes ﬁrms hesitate more before they decide to dismiss
employees. Therefore, even with a decrease in the product demand, they can try
to avoid dismissal in situations of uncertainty.
5. Estimation results
Table 4, on next page, contains a summary of the estimated coeﬃcients for
the covariates included in all estimations – with regard to the bivariate probit
model with partial observability.21 It should be highlighted that a coeﬃcient with
a positive sign, for instance, indicates that the covariate reduces the probability
of dismissal. This occurs because the dependent variable has to be constructed in
such a way that number 1 is associated with those workers who did not leave their
jobs during one year of observation.
21The coeﬃcients estimated using the bivariate probit model with full observability are shown
in table A.1, in the statistical appendix at the end of this paper. The coeﬃcients estimated by
this model were used as initial values for the estimation of the partial observability model.
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Table 4
Bivariate probit model with partial observability estimated coeﬃcients,(
∗) for the set of
covariates common to ﬁve estimations
ﬁre Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5
equation
gender (fem) NS NS -0.142 -0.051 NS
Head NS NS 0.205 0.083 0.074
Age 0.014 0.023 0.006 0.024 0.022
Educ 0.065 0.072 0.026 0.012 0.087
Tenure 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.010
Contr. -1.953 -1.056 0.939 0.823 0.428
Open unemp -18.671 -13.540 -0.651 -0.708 -3.831
gdpvar 60.646 48.761 2.254 -0.299 167.399
dec88 3.438 2.587 NS NS 0.696
dum90 -7.228 -6.062 -0.356 -0.194 0.602
dum91 13.106 9.061 0.225 0.536 3.130
dum92 33.996 24.596 0.767 1.382 7.238
dum93 39.890 29.271 1.163 1.392 8.486
dum94 29.709 21.331 1.036 1.310 7.065
dum95 29.238 20.727 1.030 1.278 7.597
dum96 47.449 33.331 1.332 1.751 9.765
dum97 51.846 36.415 1.635 2.023 10.915
dum98 77.493 55.559 2.325 2.777 16.378
dum99 87.678 61.469 3.000 3.708 19.199
Constant 130.871 93.818 5.436 5.439 26.088
quit Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5
equation
gender (fem) -0.059(
∗∗) NS NS NS NS
Head NS NS 0.312 NS 0.115
Age 0.015 0.025 NS 0.025 0.021
Educ 0.077 0.093 NS NS 0.087
Tenure 0.007 0.012 1.619 4.839 0.010
Contr. 2.408 1.873 NS NS 0.771
Open unemp 2.318 2.573 1.642 5.015 8.505
gdpvar -6.234 -18.372 -4.480 -0.533 -493.311
dec88 -0.743 -0.404 NS NS 0.364
dum90 0.835 0.600 0.176 2.351 -0.460
dum91 -1.494 -2.242 -1.949 -4.094 -10.255
dum92 -3.037 -3.642 -2.498 -6.554 -12.147
dum93 -4.681 -5.514 -4.097 -11.552 -21.218
dum94 -4.012 -4.852 -3.445 -10.965 -20.026
dum95 -3.806 -4.780 -3.813 -11.540 -19.458
dum96 -5.383 -6.463 -4.634 -12.220 -25.162
dum97 -6.356 -7.215 -5.654 -17.250 -27.727
dum98 -8.538 -10.071 -6.656 -18.070 -34.132
dum99 -10.758 -12.696 -8.929 -26.138 -46.737
Constant -16.286 -18.084 -29.236 -90.124 -51.680
Wald test 8600.130 8311.13 1485.86 4236.43 22249.94
Log likelihood -7171.604 -7493.78 -4977.746 -12596.577 -19614.812
(∗) Coefficients significant at 5%
(∗∗) Significance level greater than 5% and less than 10%
As was done in the previous section, when the meaning and expected eﬀect of
each covariate were discussed, the results will be presented by dividing the covari-
ates into two groups– those that indicate characteristics of the individuals or of the
employment relationship; and those that indicate changes in the macroeconomic
environment or in the analyzed sector.
Starting with the ﬁrst group, the variable tenure (which indicates the length
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of the employment relationship for the “reference job”) had a signiﬁcant eﬀect,
with the expected sign, on all estimations. That is, the longer job tenure reduces
the probabilities of quitting or being ﬁred, in all analyzed sectors. This result
corroborates that one obtained by Orellano (1997:82), suggesting that, in fact, the
longer job tenure results in a larger amount of speciﬁc skills, encouraging both
parties to keep the relationship stable.
The worker’s formal level of education, measured by variable educ, as described
in the previous section, is also pointed by the theory as an indicator of the amount
of speciﬁc training received by the worker (in addition to variable tenure), and
should therefore reduce the probabilities of quitting and being ﬁred. The estima-
tions conﬁrm the hypothesis of reduction in quits for the two industrial sectors and
for the service sector. The higher level of formal education of a worker certainly
reduces the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm, since the obtained results show
that this inverse relationship is signiﬁcant for all sectors.
The signiﬁcance of variable educ in ﬁre equations indicates that the costs in-
curred by the ﬁrms for adjusting the demand for labor – as expected – increase
with the level of education of the employees. The speciﬁc training costs correspond
to part of these adjustment costs that should be shared with the employees. Since
variable educ, in the civil construction and commerce sectors, is not signiﬁcant in
quit equations, this suggests low costs with speciﬁc training in these sectors, or the
inability of ﬁrms to share the costs of this training with the employees, avoiding
unwanted dismissals – or a low correlation between level of education and speciﬁc
training.
The variable contr., which is the last variable to indicate a speciﬁc character-
istic of the employment relationship, had the expected eﬀect on the probability of
dismissal by the ﬁrm, only in non-industrial sectors. That is, the formal employ-
ment relationship reduces the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm, as expected,
only in non-industrial sectors. Curiously enough, the opposite occurs in industrial
sectors.
On top of that, the variable contr had the expected (signiﬁcant) eﬀect on the
probability of quitting in the two industrial sectors and in the service sector. In
these sectors, the formal employment relationship reduces the probability of quit-
ting, even when other characteristics of the employment relationship are controlled.
This indicates that the beneﬁts obtained by the worker with the establishment of a
formal relationship (including the relatively higher job stability) are in fact valued
by the worker, reducing his propensity for quitting. In the civil construction and
commerce sectors, according to the estimation made, the variable contr has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of quitting.
The last three covariates of the ﬁrst group that was initially mentioned (which
indicate characteristics of the individual or of the employment relationship) corre-
spond to the workers’ personal characteristics: gender, head and age. The variable
age had the expected signiﬁcant eﬀect in all ﬁre equations, also having the expected
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(signiﬁcant) eﬀect in the quit equation in four sectors – the only exception was
the civil construction sector. For the reasons discussed in the third section, the
more advanced age of a worker is expected to reduce his probability to quit the
job, regardless of the correlation between age and job tenure. The probability of
dismissal by the ﬁrm should also be lower. Both hypotheses were conﬁrmed by
the results of the tests.
Diﬀerently from the variable age, the variable dummy which indicates female
individuals did not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of dismissal (quitting
or ﬁring). The only two exceptions were the ﬁre equations of the civil construction
and commerce sectors. In these sectors, the results indicate that women have a
higher probability to be dismissed by the ﬁrms.
Finally, the variable head, which indicates the household heads, did not show a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of dismissal in several sectors. Being a house-
hold head reduces the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm in the civil construction,
commerce and service sectors, but this does not occur in the industry. Moreover,
the results show that being the household head only has the signiﬁcant eﬀect of
reducing the probability of quitting in the civil construction and service sectors.
So, we move on to the analysis of the second group of covariates – which indicate
changes in the macroeconomic environment or in the analyzed sector. Here, the
ﬁrst observation is that the unemployment rate had the expected (signiﬁcant) eﬀect
on all estimations. That is, in the ﬁve analyzed sectors, a higher unemployment
rate, observed in the period prior to the termination of an employment relationship,
increases the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm and reduces the probability of
quitting on the worker’s side.
The previous sectoral GDP variation (seasonally adjusted) also had the ex-
pected eﬀect. The only exception is the ﬁre equation of the commerce sector. In
other cases, a positive previous variation of production had the expected (signiﬁ-
cant) eﬀect of reducing the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm and increasing the
probability of quitting.
Therefore, among the set of covariates included in all estimations, now we
only have to analyze the eﬀects of the dummy variables (those which indicate the
change in labor legislation and the “year dummies”).
The variable dec88, which indicates the moment of change in the Brazilian labor
legislation, had the expected eﬀect of reducing the probability of dismissal by the
ﬁrm in three sectors, not having a signiﬁcant eﬀect only in the civil construction
and commerce sectors. The eﬀect of this variable on the probability of quitting
is not consistent among sectors. The probability of quitting, after the changes in
the labor legislation, increases in industry, but decreases in the service sector, not
having a signiﬁcant change in other sectors.
These results – especially those concerning the impact of the new constitution
on the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm – are in accordance with what was
expected. Even so, they should be looked at with caution, as the fact that the
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data are available only from February 1988 onwards may have limited the analysis,
given the possibility that there might have been an anticipation of the changes
in the legislation by the agents. Gonzaga (2003) analyzed the 1982-2002 period
using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology and concluded that the increase in
dismissal cost reduced labor turnover. Furthermore, he concluded that the increase
in the FGTS penalty charge reduced the probability of agreements - in which the
initiative of dismissal is taken by the worker, but is formally registered as dismissal
by the ﬁrm.
When analyzing the “year dummies,” it should be noted that the dummies rel-
ative to the 1991-1999 period had signiﬁcant and consistent eﬀects in all analyzed
sectors. One may also observe that in 1990 the probability of dismissal by the
ﬁrm was relatively higher in four of the analyzed sectors – which is not surprising,
given the extremely restrictive adjustment policy implemented. In that year, as
expected, the probability of quitting was relatively lower in the same four sectors.
The only exception was the service sector.
From 1991 onwards, the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm begins to be rel-
atively lower in all sectors, given the control over the unemployment rate – this
eﬀect is increasingly stronger after 1995. We may say that the reduction in the
probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm increases from 1995 on because there is an
evident increase in the absolute values of coeﬃcients estimated from 1995 in all
sectors.
A possible interpretation for this result could be the ﬁrms’ modernization pro-
cess – with the adoption of new technologies of production – which most researchers
believe occurred in the 1990s due to the trade liberalization. However, the liter-
ature on the relationship between technology of production and labor turnover
assumes that technological modernization should also reduce the probability of
quitting. Nevertheless, this is not what “year dummies” indicate in quit equations.
They show an increase in the probability of quitting in the 1991-1999 period, with
other factors being controlled.
Another possible interpretation of the result obtained lies in the fact that
unemployment is not a good indicator of aggregate demand for the 1990s. The
table below shows the evolution of the GDP variation rate in S˜ ao Paulo and of
the open unemployment rate in the Metropolitan Region of S˜ ao Paulo for the
1991-1999 period.
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Table 5
Year GDP(
∗) GDP variation rate in Open unemployment rate in
S˜ ao Paulo the Metropolitan Region of
S˜ ao Paulo (
∗∗)
1991 100,14 7,917
1992 95,99 -4,14% 9,133
1993 103,97 8,31% 8,683
1994 111,20 6,95% 8,925
1995 113,42 2,00% 8,950
1996 115,84 2,13% 9,933
1997 119,49 3,15% 10,158
1998 115,47 -3,36% 11,667
1999 110.22 -4,55% 12,058
(∗) Source = FIPE macrodata
(∗∗) Source = PED/SEADE-DIEESE
Between 1991 and 1993, the GDP oscillates, decreasing and increasing, then
continuously increasing until 1997. The open unemployment rate – unlike the
GDP, as would be expected –, increases and drops again between 1991 and 1993.
However, despite the (modest) GDP increase in the 1993-1997 period, we observe
an increase in the unemployment rate throughout these years.
As mentioned in the third section, the use of the open unemployment rate
as one of the variables that can explain the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrms
presupposes that the unemployment rate of a given period provides employers
with information about the level of economic expansion. This information would
be used by ﬁrms in the subsequent period as a way to decide whether they should
hire or ﬁre employees. In fact, as previously seen, the results conﬁrm that the open
unemployment rate of a certain period increases the probability of dismissal by
the ﬁrm in the subsequent period. Nevertheless, as the unemployment rate rises
even in the presence of GDP growth, the dismissal by the ﬁrm should actually
be less probable. This may be an explanation to the increasing reduction in the
probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm observed in the “year dummies” after 1995.
Diﬀerently from what occurs with the positive relationship between unemploy-
ment and the rate of dismissal by the ﬁrms, the expected inverse relation between
unemployment and quit rates does not result from the hypothesis that unemploy-
ment is an indicator of aggregate demand. The variable that really matters when
workers have to decide whether to quit or not is the unemployment rate. Thus,
theory posits that the growing increase in the unemployment rate throughout the
1990s should reduce the probability of quitting - which was conﬁrmed by the results
obtained with the estimates.
However, given the results obtained for the “year dummies,” the estimations
suggest that the reduction in quit rates, throughout the 1990s, was not so remark-
able as expected, given the increase in unemployment. In other words, the quit
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rates in the 1990s did not respond negatively to the increase in the unemployment
rate in a linear way.
Finally, with regard to the volatile variable, which was not included in all
estimations, the results are presented in the statistical appendix at the end of this
paper. As expected, this variable reduced the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm
in two industrial sectors. Thus, the results suggest that in moments of uncertainty
the ﬁrms do not respond immediately to a reduction in sales with layoﬀs, instead,
they tend to reduce the number of working hours as a way to decrease production
until economic stability can oﬀer reasonable certainty about the future.
The eﬀect of the volatile variable on the probability of quitting was not signif-
icant in less capital-intensive sectors of the industry, being contrary to that which
was expected for the capital-intensive industry, since the increase in the production
volatility increases the probability of quitting.
Note that the volatile variable showed a strong upward trend in the 1990s, as
shown in the following graph.




















Production volatility in the industry of S˜ ao Paulo (1985-2000)
In this graph, constructed with data from FIESP, the variable TPO represents
the number of employees carrying out production work and the variable INA rep-
resents an indicator of the level of activity of S˜ ao Paulo’s industries. From 1994
onwards, there is a growing level of activity (with strong oscillations) and a de-
crease in the total number of employees in production work.22 The variable HEX,
which indicates the number of extra working hours worked in production, shows
an upward trend, and so does the level of activity. The variable GARCH-INAF
corresponds to the volatile variable used for the estimations in this paper. Note
that, from 1994 on, industrial production volatility has a relatively higher and
more unstable level, especially if compared with the 1991-1993 period.
6. Conclusions
In this study, the analysis of the determinants of dismissals and quits revealed
some patterns common to most or all sectors analyzed. These patterns may be
observed more clearly in table 4, in the previous section.
Beginning with workers’ personal characteristics, age and level of formal edu-
cation showed clear and consistent eﬀects. Age strongly reduces the probability of
dismissal and also reduces the probability of quitting in four of the ﬁve analyzed
sectors. A similar behavior is observed for the level of formal education, thus
22These data show that increases in the level of production were not followed by an increase
in labor demand, due to the decrease in the number of employees working in production. The
increase in production seems to result from the increase in the number of extra hours worked.
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indicating higher costs for the ﬁrm with the hiring and ﬁring of employees who
have a better level of education. Moreover, as a higher level of formal education
substantially reduces the probability of quitting in the industry and in the service
sector, the results suggest that in these sectors the costs with speciﬁc training are
positively correlated with the level of formal education.
As for the characteristics of each employment relationship, the results obtained
show that job tenure reduces the probability of quitting and the probability of
dismissal by the ﬁrm, in all analyzed sectors. This strongly suggests that the
acquisition of speciﬁc skills by the worker induces longer employment relationships
and greater loyalty from both sides.
It was also observed that a formal employment relationship reduces the proba-
bility of quitting, as expected. However, the establishment of a formal employment
relationship only reduces the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm in non-industrial
sectors, having the opposite eﬀect on the industry, diﬀerently from what one would
expect.
By analyzing the eﬀects of the variables that indicate changes in the macroeco-
nomic environment, we noted that the marginal eﬀect of the open unemployment
rate in the ﬁve sectors analyzed was consistent with the theories about dismissal
and quit determinants. In other words, the unemployment rate of a given period
has a negative eﬀect on the probability of quitting and a positive eﬀect on the
probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm in the subsequent period.
Nonetheless, the results suggest that the increase in the unemployment rate
observed in the 1990s had an increasingly weaker eﬀect on the rate of dismissals
by the ﬁrms. In addition, the quit rates in the 1990s did not respond negatively
to the increase in the unemployment rate in a linear way.
The changes to the Brazilian labor legislations made in November 1988 reduced
the probability of dismissal by the ﬁrm, as expected, not showing a signiﬁcant eﬀect
only in the civil construction and commerce sectors. This result corroborates
the conclusions reached by Gonzaga (2003) who, after using the diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences methodology, concluded that the increase in dismissal costs decreased
labor turnover. On the other hand, following our results, the eﬀect of the change
in legislation on the probability of quitting is not consistent across sectors.
These results about the eﬀects of institutional changes should be carefully
weighted, because the data began to be collected in February 1988, which may
limit the analysis, given the possible anticipation of institutional changes by the
agents.
Finally, we conclude that an increase in industrial production volatility as a
whole, which may be considered a way to measure uncertainty about the future,
reduces the responses of industrial ﬁrms (dismissals) to variations in the economic
activity.
Our results do not allow us to conclude that the changes in production tech-
nology in the 1990s reduced labor turnover – which would be expected in case
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of technological improvement. This is, however, an issue that should be further
investigated.
References
Amadeo, E. J., Barros, R. P., Camargo, J. M., Mendon¸ ca, R., Pero, V., & Urani,
A. (1993). Ajuste estrutural e ﬂexibilidade do mercado de trabalho no Brasil.
Anais da Anpec, 2:503–531.
Baltar, P. E. & Proni, M. W. (1995). Flexibilidade do trabalho, emprego e estru-
tura salarial no Brasil. Cadernos do CESIT, Texto para Discuss˜ ao 15, Unicamp,
Campinas, SP.
Barron, J. M. & McCaﬀerty, S. (1977). Job search, labor supply, and the quit
decision: Theory and evidence. The American Economic Review, 67(4):683–
691.
Barros, R. P., Corseuil, C. H., & Bahia, M. (1999a). Labor market regulations and
the duration of employment in brazil. Instituto de Pesquisa Econˆ omica Aplicada
– IPEA, Texto para Discuss˜ ao Interna 676, Rio de Janeiro.
Barros, R. P., Corseuil, C. H., & Foguel, M. N. (2001). Os incentivos adversos e a
focaliza¸ c˜ ao dos programas de prote¸ c˜ ao ao trabalhador no Brasil. IPEA, Texto
Para Discuss˜ ao Interna, 784, Rio de Janeiro.
Barros, R. P., Corseuil, C. H., & Gonzaga, G. (1999b). Labor market regulations
and the demand for labor in Brazil. IPEA, Texto para discuss˜ ao Interna, 656,
Rio de Janeiro.
Beaudry, P. (1994). Entry wages signaling the credibility of future wages: A
reinterpretation of the turnover-eﬃciency-wage model. Canadian Journal of
Economics, XXVII(4):884–902.
Becker, G. S. (1962). Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. Journal
of Political Economy, pages 9–49.
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis, with
special reference to education. Columbia University Press, New York.
Burdett, K. (1978). A theory of employee job search and quit rates. The American
Economic Review, 68(1):212–220.
Cacciamali, M. C. (1992). Mudan¸ cas estruturais e na regula¸ c˜ ao do mercado de
trabalho no Brasil nos anos 80. Texto para Discuss˜ ao Interna, 6, IPE/USP.
Carvalho, P. G. M. & Feij´ o, C. A. V. (1993). Rotatividade do pessoal ocupado
na ind´ ustria: Sua evolu¸ c˜ ao nos anos recentes – 1985-1993. Anais da Associa¸ c˜ ao
Brasileira de Estudos do trabalho.
28 Brazilian Review of Econometrics 25(1) May 2005An Analysis of Quit and Dismissal Determinants between 1988 and 1999 using the
Bivariate Probit Model
Chahad, J. P. & Fernandes, R. (2001). Unemployment insurance and transitions
in the labor market: An evaluation of Brazil’s program. Texto para Discuss˜ ao,
S´ erie Economia, FEA-USP, Campus de Ribeir˜ ao Preto.
Chahad, J. P., Orellano, V. I. F., & Picchetti, P. (2001). A bivariate probit analysis
of quits and dismissals. Anais do XXIII Encontro da Sociedade Brasileira de
Econometria.
Chang, C. & Wang, Y. (1995). A framework for understanding diﬀerences in labor
turnover and human capital investment. Journal of Economic Behaviour and
organization, September.
Chang, C. & Wang, Y. (1996). Human capital investment under asymmetric
information: The Pigovian conjecture revisited. Journal of Labor Economics,
14(3):505–519.
Corseuil, C. H., Ribeiro, E. P., Santos, D., & Servo, L. (2002). Job and worker ﬂows
in Brazil. In Menezes-Filho, N. A., editor, Labor Market Dynamics in Brazil.
Inter-American Development Bank Research Network, 11th Round, FIPE-USP.
Doeringer, P. B. & Piore, M. J. (1971). Internal labor markets and manpower
analysis. D.C. Heath and Company and Heath Lexington books, Massachusetts.
Ehrenberg, R. & Smith, R. (1994). Modern Labor Economics. Harper Collins.
Fifth Edition.
Gonzaga, G. (1998). Rotatividade e qualidade do emprego no Brasil. Revista de
Economia Pol´ ıtica.
Gonzaga, G. (2003). Labor turnover and labor legislation in Brasil. Economia,
4(1). Fall.
Greene, W. H. (1990). Econometrics Analysis. Macmillan Publishing Company,
New York.
Gunderson, M. (1974). Retention of trainees: A study with dichotomous dependent
variables. Journal of Econometrics, 2.
Hamermesh, D. S. & Pfann, G. (1992). Turnover and the dynamics of labor de-
mand. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper 4204, Cambridge,
MA.
Heckman, J. (1978). Dummy endogenous variables in a simultaneous equation
system. Econometrica, 46(6).
Katz, L. F. (1986). Eﬃciency wage theories: A partial evaluation. National Bureau
of Economic Reserarch, Working paper 4034, Cambridge, MA.
Brazilian Review of Econometrics 25(1) May 2005 29Veronica I. F. Orellano and Paulo Picchetti
Lynch, L. M. (1992). Diﬀerential eﬀects of post-school training on early career mo-
bility. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper 4034, Cambridge,
MA.
Menezes-Filho, N. & Picchetti, P. (2000). Os determinantes da dura¸ c˜ ao do desem-
prego em S˜ ao Paulo. Pesquisa e Planejamento Econˆ omico, 30(1).
Meng, C. & Schmidt, P. (1985). On the cost of partial observability in the bivariate
probit model. International Economic Review, 26(1):71–85.
Metcalf, D. (1987). Labour market ﬂexibility and jobs: A survey of evidence from
OECD countries with special reference to Europe. In Layard, R. & Calmfors,
L., editors, The Fight Against Unemployment: Macroeconomic Papers from the
Center of European Studies, pages 51–76. MIT Press. First edition.
Milgron, P. & Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, Organization and Management.
Prentice-Hall International, Inc.
Mincer, J. (1978). Family migration decisions. Journal of Political Economy,
86(5):749–773.
Mincer, J. (1988). Job training, wage growth and labor turnover. National Bureau
of Economic Research, Working paper 2690, Cambridge, MA, pp. 1–43.
Mincer, J. (1994). Human capital, a review. In Kerr, C. & Staudohar, P. D.,
editors, Labor Economics and Industrial Relations: Markets and Institutions,
pages 109–141. Wertheim publications in Industrial Relations.
Nickell, S. J. (1978). Fixed costs, employment and labour demand over the cycle.
Economica, 45(11):329–345.
Nickell, S. J. (1986). Dynamic modles of labour demand. In Ashenfelter, O.
& Layard, R., editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, pages 473–522. North-
Holland, Amsterdam.
Nickell, S. J. (1995). Labour market dynamics in OECD countries. Discussion
and working papers, Institute of Economics and Statistics, Oxford University,
November 27th.
Oi, W. (1962). Labor as a quasi-ﬁxed factor. Journal of political economy, 4:538–
555.
Orellano, V. I. F. (1997). Um estudo dos determinantes da rotatividade da m˜ ao-
de-obra na regi˜ ao metropolitana de S˜ ao Paulo. Master’s thesis, IPE-USP, S˜ ao
Paulo.
30 Brazilian Review of Econometrics 25(1) May 2005An Analysis of Quit and Dismissal Determinants between 1988 and 1999 using the
Bivariate Probit Model
Pfeﬀer, J. & Cohen, Y. (1984). Determinants of internal labor markets in organi-
zations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29(4):550–572.
Poirier, D. J. (1980). Partial observability in bivariate probit models. Journal of
Econometrics, 12:209–217.
Ribeiro, E. P. (2001). Rotatividade de trabalhadores e cria¸ c˜ ao e destrui¸ c˜ ao de
postos de trabalho: Aspectos conceituais. IPEA, Texto para Discuss˜ ao 820, Rio
de Janeiro.
Rossi-Junior & Ferreira (1999). Evolu¸ c˜ ao da produtividade industrial brasileira e
abertura comercial. Pesquisa e Planejamento Econˆ omico, abril.
Rothenberg, T. J. (1971). Identiﬁcation in parametric models. Econometrica,
39:577–591.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Mar-
kets, Relational Contracting. The Free Press, New York.
Brazilian Review of Econometrics 25(1) May 2005 31Veronica I. F. Orellano and Paulo Picchetti
Appendix
Table A.1 Bi-variate probit model supposing full observability
Coeﬃcients estimated for the set of covariates common to ﬁve estimations
Fire equation Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5
gender (fem) .0352307 .0401462 .0403471 -.0366972 .0875071
Head -.0416411 -.0539163 .2454214 .0498367 .0461325
Age .0107593 .0167458 .0042397 .0233686 .0152634
Educ .0599793 .0729176 .0715087 .0176912 .0730478
Tenure .0061098 .0105283 .0122813 .0111461 .0094979
Contr. 1.53837 1.059465 1.187233 .792224 .6273701
Open unemp -.3795738 -.2787416 -.4990215 -.4181323 -.4728512
Dec88 -.0284129 .1878556 -.0186184 .0129865 .2399117
dum90 -.1253643 -.1650849 -.3383414 -.120917 -.2745807
dum91 .2298491 .0243607 .0180771 .3069819 .1045842
dum92 .4585622 .2182067 .4212012 .7730122 .445338
dum93 .6720309 .3404972 .6278311 .7087583 .7051495
dum94 .7174339 .4191607 .6057929 .6748439 .6320125
dum95 .7130776 .2988677 .5864893 .6026432 .5277366
dum96 1.053424 .4879037 .7758525 .8445145 .8522529
dum97 1.107757 .5406048 .9270825 1.019143 .969753
dum98 1.614832 .8496801 1.477283 1.429535 1.485022
dum99 2.046425 1.242935 1.951079 2.003936 2.124014
Gdpvar 1.53594 1.18846 1.74439 -.1811668 -.7484837
Constant 2.309571 1.579248 3.381701 3.121573 3.387921
Quit equation Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3 Sector 4 Sector 5
Gender (fem) -.1262818 -.1412477 -.2341833 -.1810372 -.1426336
Head .0827894 .0916997 .2192805 .1686392 .1080326
Age .0141213 .0230194 .011679 .0284766 .0251968
Educ .0464904 .0540914 .0061728 .0109909 .0718111
Tenure .0059464 .0105188 .0122785 .0117806 .0126323
Contr. 1.654448 1.365011 1.074783 1.335923 1.134731
Open unemp -.1250488 -.1622876 -.1606095 -.2355593 -.2591108
Dec88 -.0798298 .2460951 .0094652 -.0553352 .1989715
dum90 .1549682 .0760854 .0764645 .0140695 -.0506379
dum91 .2842246 .2654032 .2424034 .306023 .2780664
dum92 .5074998 .3991418 .4051679 .6489914 .4728483
dum93 .5454405 .4816489 .7840067 .6192042 .6324841
dum94 .5376673 .443559 .6312405 .6031951 .5673132
dum95 .5440824 .4931757 .6168609 .6315355 .5191628
dum96 .7672185 .7362847 .7409211 .9255635 .876128
dum97 .7926086 .8159995 .9247378 .8919255 .9797305
dum98 .9490591 .9379974 1.128099 1.280053 1.275958
dum99 1.338152 1.196137 1.682875 1.748608 1.720312
Gdpvar -.6809879 -1.060919 -.81414 -.1183126 -12.08746
Constant .9860661 1.062759 1.692561 1.759791 1.707142
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Table A.2 Bi-Variate Probit Model Supposing Full Observability (Sector 1)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr. Open unemp dec88
volatile dum90 dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97 dum98 dum99 gdpvar;
Bivariate probit regression Number of obs = 73689
Wald chi2(40) = 24632.22
Log likelihood = -17096.273 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender .0352307 .0221263 1.59 0.111 -.008136 .0785975
head -.0416411 .0223384 -1.86 0.062 -.0854234 .0021413
age .0107593 .0009543 11.28 0.000 .0088889 .0126296
educ .0599793 .0049264 12.18 0.000 .0503237 .069635
tenure .0061098 .0001966 31.08 0.000 .0057245 .0064951
contr. 1.53837 .0471837 32.60 0.000 1.445892 1.630849
Open unemp -.3795738 .0162001 -23.43 0.000 -.4113254 -.3478222
dec88 -.0284129 .0474943 -0.60 0.550 -.1215 .0646743
volatile -48.42554 7.737352 -6.26 0.000 -63.59047 -33.26061
dum90 -.1253643 .0414077 -3.03 0.002 -.206522 -.0442066
dum91 .2298491 .040431 5.68 0.000 .1506058 .3090924
dum92 .4585622 .0444684 10.31 0.000 .3714057 .5457187
dum93 .6720309 .0513097 13.10 0.000 .5714656 .7725961
dum94 .7174339 .048891 14.67 0.000 .6216094 .8132585
dum95 .7130776 .0506424 14.08 0.000 .6138204 .8123348
dum96 1.053424 .059353 17.75 0.000 .9370939 1.169754
dum97 1.107757 .0626942 17.67 0.000 .9848788 1.230636
dum98 1.614832 .0789488 20.45 0.000 1.460095 1.769569
dum99 2.046425 .0968333 21.13 0.000 1.856636 2.236215
gdpvar 1.53594 .2611899 5.88 0.000 1.024017 2.047862
cons 2.309571 .1193567 19.35 0.000 2.075636 2.543506
quit
gender -.1262818 .030917 -4.08 0.000 -.186878 -.0656857
head .0827894 .0357241 2.32 0.020 .0127716 .1528073
age .0141213 .0014612 9.66 0.000 .0112574 .0169853
educ .0464904 .0077919 5.97 0.000 .0312187 .0617622
tenure .0059464 .0003355 17.72 0.000 .0052888 .0066041
contr. 1.654448 .0733372 22.56 0.000 1.51071 1.798186
Open unemp -.1250488 .0232873 -5.37 0.000 -.1706911 -.0794065
dec88 -.0798298 .0762391 -1.05 0.295 -.2292557 .0695962
volatile -4.479341 11.21781 -0.40 0.690 -26.46585 17.50717
dum90 .1549682 .0617163 2.51 0.012 .0340066 .2759298
dum91 .2842246 .0554335 5.13 0.000 .1755769 .3928724
dum92 .5074998 .0670707 7.57 0.000 .3760437 .6389559
dum93 .5454405 .0769528 7.09 0.000 .3946158 .6962652
dum94 .5376673 .0697984 7.70 0.000 .400865 .6744697
dum95 .5440824 .0715266 7.61 0.000 .4038928 .684272
dum96 .7672185 .0848635 9.04 0.000 .6008892 .9335478
dum97 .7926086 .0904059 8.77 0.000 .6154162 .9698009
dum98 .9490591 .109203 8.69 0.000 .7350251 1.163093
dum99 1.338152 .1475531 9.07 0.000 1.048953 1.62735
gdpvar -.6809879 .3658443 -1.86 0.063 -1.39803 .0360537
cons .9860661 .1731499 5.69 0.000 .6466985 1.325434
/athrho -8.361176 36.96786 -0.23 0.821 -80.81684 64.09449
rho -.9999999 8.08e-06 -1 1
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 2413.89 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.3 Bi-Variate Probit Model With Partial Observability (Sector 1)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr.
Open unemp dec88 volatile dum90 dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97
dum98 dum99 gdpvar, partial difficult from (coefss);
Partial observability bivariate probit Number of obs = 73689
Wald chi2(40) = 8600.13
Log likelihood = -7171.6038 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender .0434045 .0680368 0.64 0.524 -.0899452 .1767542
head -.0226512 .661455 -0.34 0.732 -.152294 .1069916
age .0141564 .0028035 5.05 0.000 .0086616 .0196511
educ .0650094 .0144643 4.49 0.000 .0366599 .093359
tenure .0037876 .0004985 7.60 0.000 .0028106 .0047646
contr. -1.952644 .1732449 -11.27 0.000 -2.292198 -1.613091
open unemp -18.67143 .6056775 -30.83 0.000 -19.85853 -17.48432
dec88 3.437922 .1752672 19.62 0.000 3.094404 3.781439
volatile 1094.07 59.62661 18.35 0.000 977.2037 1210.936
dum90 -7.227683 .3246612 -22.26 0.000 -7.864008 -6.591359
dum91 13.10596 .5159498 25.40 0.000 12.09471 14.1172
dum92 33.99629 1.129509 30.10 0.000 31.78249 36.21009
dum93 39.88956 1.288753 30.95 0.000 37.36366 42.41547
dum94 29.70863 .9526881 31.18 0.000 27.84139 31.57586
dum95 29.23824 .9442003 30.97 0.000 27.38764 31.08884
dum96 47.4491 1.539097 30.83 0.000 44.43252 50.46567
dum97 51.84625 1.689745 30.68 0.000 48.53441 55.15809
dum98 77.49315 2.493947 31.07 0.000 72.60511 82.3812
dum99 87.67844 7.395298 11.86 0.000 73.18392 102.173
gdpvar 60.64638 2.170279 27.94 0.000 56.39271 64.90005
cons 130.8711 4.226415 30.97 0.000 122.5874 139.1547
quit
gender -.0589781 .0335601 -1.76 0.079 -.1247547 .0067986
head -.0118676 .0341065 -0.35 0.728 -.078715 .0549799
age .0147756 .0014292 10.34 0.000 .0119744 .0175768
educ .0770168 .0074883 10.28 0.000 .06234 .0916935
tenure .0066853 .0003018 22.15 0.000 .0060937 .0072769
contr. 2.407705 .0699283 34.43 0.000 2.270648 2.544761
Open unemp 2.318052 .0489386 47.37 0.000 2.222134 2.413969
dec88 -.7434192 .0711131 -10.45 0.000 -.8827984 -.60404
volatile -44.99974 13.39934 -3.36 0.001 -71.26196 -18.73753
dum90 .835179 .0550535 15.17 0.000 .727276 .9430819
dum91 -1.493514 .0746935 -20.00 0.000 -1.63991 -1.347117
dum92 -3.036671 .0827375 -36.70 0.000 -3.198834 -2.874509
dum93 -4.681018 .1125512 -41.59 0.000 -4.901614 -4.460422
dum94 -4.011902 .1050102 -38.20 0.000 -4.217718 -3.806086
dum95 -3.806077 .1211192 -31.42 0.000 -4.043466 -3.568688
dum96 -5.38341 .136132 -39.55 0.000 -5.650224 -5.116596
dum97 -6.355623 .1672998 -37.99 0.000 -6.683525 -6.027722
dum98 -8.537992 .1943355 -43.93 0.000 -8.918882 -8.157101
dum99 -10.75788 .263807 -40.78 0.000 -11.27493 -10.24083
gdpvar -6.23445 .8066165 -7.73 0.000 -7.81539 -4.653511
cons -16.28598 .3417294 -47.66 0.000 -16.95575 -15.6162
/athrho -611.4712 229.9769 -2.66 0.008 -1062.218 -160.7248
rho -1 0 -1 -1
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 7.06942 Prob > chi2 = 0.0078
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Table A.4 Bi-Variate Probit Model Supposing Full Observability (Sector 2)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr.open unemp dec 88
volatile dum90 dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97 dum98 dum99 gdpvar;
Bivariate probit regression Number of obs = 60168
Wald chi2(40) = 13994.86
Log likelihood = -18899.826 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender .0401462 .0192322 2.09 0.037 .0024518 .0778407
head -.0539163 .0227201 -2.37 0.018 -.0984469 -.0093856
age .0167458 .0008826 18.97 0.000 .015016 .0184756
educ .0729176 .0054371 13.41 0.000 .062261 .0835742
tenure .0105283 .0002469 42.64 0.000 .0100444 .0110122
contr. 1.059465 .0535641 19.78 0.000 .9544808 1.164448
open unemp -.2787416 .0161327 -17.28 0.000 -.3103612 -.247122
dec88 .1878556 .0552903 3.40 0.001 .0794886 .2962227
volatile -19.36072 8.217648 -2.36 0.018 -35.46701 -3.254425
dum90 -.1650849 .0433405 -3.81 0.000 -.2500307 -.0801391
dum91 .0243607 .0428847 0.57 0.570 -.0596918 .1084132
dum92 .2182067 .0452283 4.82 0.000 .129561 .3068525
dum93 .3404972 .0503596 6.76 0.000 .2417942 .4392002
dum94 .4191607 .0490013 8.55 0.000 .32312 .5152015
dum95 .2988677 .0523236 5.71 0.000 .1963154 .40142
dum96 .4879037 .0595781 8.19 0.000 .3711329 .6046746
dum97 .5406048 .0631275 8.56 0.000 .4168772 .6643323
dum98 .8496801 .0811941 10.46 0.000 .6905426 1.008818
dum99 1.242935 .1001669 12.41 0.000 1.046612 1.439259
gdpvar 1.18846 .2582803 4.60 0.000 .6822402 1.69468
cons 1.579248 .1181864 13.36 0.000 1.347607 1.81089
quit
gender -.1412477 .0255861 -5.52 0.000 -.1913956 -.0910998
head .0916997 .0336365 2.73 0.006 .0257734 .1576259
age .0230194 .0012602 18.27 0.000 .0205494 .0254894
educ .0540914 .0076933 7.03 0.000 .0390128 .06917
tenure .0105188 .0003655 28.78 0.000 .0098024 .0112352
contr. 1.365011 .0778007 17.54 0.000 1.212525 1.517498
open unemp -.1622876 .0226577 -7.16 0.000 -.2066958 -.1178794
dec88 .2460951 .0851272 2.89 0.004 .0792489 .4129413
volatile -7.9166 11.34889 -0.70 0.485 -30.16002 14.32682
dum90 .0760854 .0565214 1.35 0.178 -.0346946 .1868654
dum91 .2654032 .0568103 4.67 0.000 .154057 .3767494
dum92 .3991418 .0607697 6.57 0.000 .2800354 .5182483
dum93 .4816489 .0687445 7.01 0.000 .3469122 .6163856
dum94 .443559 .0643255 6.90 0.000 .3174832 .5696347
dum95 .4931757 .0696218 7.08 0.000 .3567194 .6296319
dum96 .7362847 .0821551 8.96 0.000 .5752637 .8973057
dum97 .8159995 .0866853 9.41 0.000 .6460994 .9858995
dum98 .9379974 .1104916 8.49 0.000 .7214378 1.154557
dum99 1.196137 .1387465 8.62 0.000 .9241991 1.468075
gdpvar -1.060919 .3064968 -3.46 0.001 -1.661641 -.4601961
cons 1.062759 .1662903 6.39 0.000 .7368355 1.388682
/athrho -8.022917 39.80941 -0.20 0.840 -86.04793 70.00209
rho -.9999998 .0000171 -1 1
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 2942.33 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.5 Bi-Variate Probit Model With Partial Observability (Sector 2)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr. Open unemp dec 88
volatile dum90 dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97 dum98 dum99 gdpvar,
partial difficult from (coefss);
Partial observability bivariate probit Number of obs = 60168
Wald chi2(40) = 8311.13
Log likelihood = -7493.7865 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender .0575158 .0455467 1.26 0.207 -.031754 .1467857
head -.0281923 .0507607 -0.56 0.579 -.1276815 .0712969
age .0228815 .0020966 10.91 0.000 .0187723 .0269907
educ .0720952 .0124505 5.79 0.000 .0476927 .0964977
tenure .0099313 .0005228 19.00 0.000 .0089065 .010956
contr. -1.056315 .1248434 -8.46 0.000 -1.301003 -.8116263
open unemp -13.54039 .3505575 -38.63 0.000 -14.22747 -12.85331
dec88 2.587495 .1340384 19.30 0.000 2.324785 2.850206
volatile 963.3092 39.74892 24.23 0.000 885.4028 1041.216
dum90 -6.062392 .2174625 -27.88 0.000 -6.48861 -5.636173
dum91 9.06146 .2454291 36.92 0.000 8.580428 9.542493
dum92 24.59557 .6530141 37.66 0.000 23.31569 25.87546
dum93 29.27076 .754085 38.82 0.000 27.79278 30.74874
dum94 21.33123 .5568245 38.31 0.000 20.23988 22.42259
dum95 20.7273 .5573783 37.19 0.000 19.63486 21.81974
dum96 33.33077 .8700109 38.31 0.000 31.62558 35.03596
dum97 36.41492 .9454118 38.52 0.000 34.56194 38.26789
dum98 55.55901 1.444473 38.46 0.000 52.72789 58.39012
dum99 61.46879 1.83826 33.44 0.000 57.86586 65.07171
gdpvar 48.76103 1.716527 28.41 0.000 45.3967 52.12536
cons 93.81797 2.432751 38.56 0.000 89.04987 98.58607
quit
gender -.0284509 .0295457 -0.96 0.336 -.0863595 .0294576
head -.0446279 .0347296 -1.29 0.199 -.1126966 .0234408
age .0248164 .0013635 18.20 0.000 .0221439 .0274889
educ .0933057 .0083251 11.21 0.000 .0769888 .1096227
tenure .0117382 .0003794 30.94 0.000 .0109946 .0124818
contr. 1.872766 .0792791 23.62 0.000 1.717382 2.028151
Open unemp 2.572859 .0472612 54.44 0.000 2.480228 2.665489
dec88 -.4038448 .0830331 -4.86 0.000 -.5665868 -.2411029
volatile 1.408893 11.84604 0.12 0.905 -21.80893 24.62671
dum90 .600227 .0556242 10.79 0.000 .4912055 .7092485
dum91 -2.241585 .0726863 -30.84 0.000 -2.384048 -2.099123
dum92 -3.641634 .0848614 -42.91 0.000 -3.80796 -3.475309
dum93 -5.513964 .1120687 -49.20 0.000 -5.733614 -5.294313
dum94 -4.851542 .1052571 -46.09 0.000 -5.057842 -4.645242
dum95 -4.780431 .1219595 -39.20 0.000 -5.019467 -4.541394
dum96 -6.463096 .133124 -48.55 0.000 -6.724014 -6.202178
dum97 -7.215278 .1630737 -44.25 0.000 -7.534897 -6.89566
dum98 -10.07081 .1924303 -52.33 0.000 -10.44797 -9.693654
dum99 -12.69578 .2548655 -49.81 0.000 -13.19531 -12.19625
gdpvar -18.37236 .5576397 -32.95 0.000 -19.46531 -17.27941
cons -18.08385 .3295252 -54.88 0.000 -18.72971 -17.43799
/athrho 1094.819 51.56425 21.23 0.000 993.7551 1195.883
rho . . -1 1
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 450.804 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.6 Bi-Variate Probit Model Supposing Full Observability (Sector 3)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr. Open unemp dec 88 dum 90
dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97 dum98 dum99 gdpvar,
Bivariate probit regression Number of obs = 23261
Wald chi2(38) = 7811.37
Log likelihood = -8973.2462 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender .0403471 .0682966 0.59 0.555 -.0935117 .1742059
head .2454214 .0294409 8.34 0.000 .1877182 .3031246
age .0042397 .0010711 3.96 0.000 .0021404 .0063391
educ .0715087 .0087335 8.19 0.000 .0543913 .088626
tenure .0122813 .0002927 41.95 0.000 .0117076 .0128551
contr. 1.187233 .148248 8.01 0.000 .8966718 1.477793
open unemp -.4990215 .0218302 -22.86 0.000 -.541808 -.4562351
dec88 -.0186184 .1515075 -0.12 0.902 -.3155676 .2783308
dum90 -.3383414 .0583185 -5.80 0.000 -.4526436 -.2240391
dum91 .0180771 .0578137 0.31 0.755 -.0952357 .1313898
dum92 .4212012 .0693613 6.07 0.000 .2852556 .5571468
dum93 .6278311 .0711694 8.82 0.000 .4883417 .7673205
dum94 .6057929 .0709795 8.53 0.000 .4666756 .7449102
dum95 .5864893 .072667 8.07 0.000 .4440645 .728914
dum96 .7758525 .0810538 9.57 0.000 .61699 .934715
dum97 .9270825 .0871818 10.63 0.000 .7562094 1.097956
dum98 1.477283 .1101554 13.41 0.000 1.261382 1.693183
dum99 1.951079 .125526 15.54 0.000 1.705053 2.197106
gdpvar 1.74439 .3695408 4.72 0.000 1.020104 2.468677
cons 3.381701 .1745772 19.37 0.000 3.039536 3.723866
quit
gender -.2341833 .0926321 -2.53 0.011 -.4157389 -.0526278
head .2192805 .048377 4.53 0.000 .1244633 .3140976
age .011679 .0019204 6.08 0.000 .007915 .015443
educ .0061728 .0139441 0.44 0.658 -.0211571 .0335028
tenure .0122785 .0005768 21.29 0.000 .011148 .013409
contr. 1.074783 .1717058 6.26 0.000 .7382455 1.41132
open unemp -.1606095 .033476 -4.80 0.000 -.2262212 -.0949977
dec88 .0094652 .1822506 0.05 0.959 -.3477393 .3666698
dum90 .0764645 .0721904 1.06 0.290 -.0650261 .2179551
dum91 .2424034 .0781621 3.10 0.002 .0892085 .3955982
dum92 .4051679 .099802 4.06 0.000 .2095595 .6007763
dum93 .7840067 .1106168 7.09 0.000 .5672017 1.000812
dum94 .6312405 .1055317 5.98 0.000 .4244021 .8380789
dum95 .6168609 .1090945 5.65 0.000 .4030396 .8306822
dum96 .7409211 .1225933 6.04 0.000 .5006426 .9811996
dum97 .9247378 .1336596 6.92 0.000 .6627699 1.186706
dum98 1.128099 .1697227 6.65 0.000 .7954484 1.460749
dum99 1.682875 .208148 8.08 0.000 1.274912 2.090837
gdpvar -.81414 .572918 -1.42 0.155 -1.937039 .3087587
cons 1.692561 .2739312 6.18 0.000 1.155665 2.229456
/athrho -8.378458 67.12656 -0.12 0.901 -139.9441 123.1872
rho -.9999999 .0000142 -1 1
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 912.457 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.7 Bi-Variate Probit With Partial Observability (Sector 3)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr. Open unemp dec 88 dum 90
dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97 dum98 dum99 gdpvar, partial difficult
from (coefss):
Partial observability bivariate probit Number of obs = 23261
Wald chi2(38) = 1485.86
Log likelihood = -4977.7458 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender -.1415639 .0729773 -1.94 0.052 -.2845967 .001469
head .2051396 .0354109 5.79 0.000 .1357356 .2745437
age .0058387 .0012661 4.61 0.000 .0033573 .0083202
educ .0262907 .0095916 2.74 0.006 .0074915 .04509
tenure .0030916 .0002811 11.00 0.000 .0025407 .0036425
contr. .93876 .1609903 5.83 0.000 .6232248 1.254295
open unemp -.6508156 .0295595 -22.02 0.000 -.7087511 -.5928801
dec88 -.0719113 .1642719 -0.44 0.662 -.3938784 .2500557
dum90 -.3564335 .0672756 -5.30 0.000 -.4882913 -.2245757
dum91 .2247531 .0667296 3.37 0.001 .0939656 .3555407
dum92 .7673557 .0824682 9.30 0.000 .6057211 .9289904
dum93 1.16277 .0901983 12.89 0.000 .9859847 1.339556
dum94 1.036434 .0866256 11.96 0.000 .8666505 1.206217
dum95 1.029665 .0877707 11.73 0.000 .8576378 1.201692
dum96 1.331943 .1018538 13.08 0.000 1.132314 1.531573
dum97 1.635187 .11114 14.71 0.000 1.417357 1.853017
dum98 2.324668 .1431772 16.24 0.000 2.044046 2.60529
dum99 3.000136 .1645285 18.23 0.000 2.677666 3.322606
gdpvar 2.254007 .4575949 4.93 0.000 1.357138 3.150877
cons 5.436422 .2254568 24.11 0.000 4.994535 5.87831
quit
gender -.1913158 .3199146 -0.60 0.550 -.818337 .4357053
head .3124811 .1487498 2.10 0.036 .0209367 .6040254
age .0022508 .0054971 0.41 0.682 -.0085232 .0130249
educ .0478361 .0523914 0.91 0.361 -.0548492 .1505214
tenure 1.618773 .1354364 11.95 0.000 1.353322 1.884223
contr. 2.482514 4.914493 0.51 0.613 -7.149715 12.11474
open unemp 1.642181 .2156687 7.61 0.000 1.219478 2.064884
dec88 -1.791896 4.916239 -0.36 0.715 -11.42755 7.843755
dum90 .1758988 .3160055 0.56 0.578 -.4434606 .7952583
dum91 -1.949461 .3676386 -5.30 0.000 -2.670019 -1.228902
dum92 -2.498116 .4531653 -5.51 0.000 -3.386303 -1.609928
dum93 -4.096513 .5731863 -7.15 0.000 -5.219937 -2.973088
dum94 -3.445245 .5826805 -5.91 0.000 -4.587278 -2.303212
dum95 -3.812908 .5911462 -6.45 0.000 -4.971533 -2.654283
dum96 -4.634096 .6571422 -7.05 0.000 -5.922071 -3.346121
dum97 -5.65397 .7703934 -7.34 0.000 -7.163913 -4.144027
dum98 -6.655647 .9239364 -7.20 0.000 -8.466529 -4.844765
dum99 -8.928589 1.198129 -7.45 0.000 -11.27688 -6.580299
gdpvar -4.479619 2.094276 -2.14 0.032 -8.584325 -.3749126
cons -29.23619 2.877918 -10.16 0.000 -34.8768 -23.59557
/athrho 617.6828 81.31443 7.60 0.000 458.3094 777.0561
rho 1 0 1 1
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 57.7026 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
38 Brazilian Review of Econometrics 25(1) May 2005An Analysis of Quit and Dismissal Determinants between 1988 and 1999 using the
Bivariate Probit Model
Table A.8 Bi-Variate Probit Model Supposing Observability (Sector 4)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr. open unemp dec 88 dum 90
dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97 dum98 dum99 gdpvar;
Bivariate probit regression Number of obs = 80583
Wald chi2(38) = 63357.15
Log likelihood = -24620.822 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender -.0366972 .0178969 -2.05 0.040 -.0717746 -.0016199
head .0498367 .0224326 2.22 0.026 .0058697 .0938037
age .0233686 .0008443 27.68 0.000 .0217137 .0250234
educ .0176912 .0049971 3.54 0.000 .007897 .0274854
tenure .0111461 .0002546 43.77 0.000 .0106471 .0116452
contr. .792224 .0759411 10.43 0.000 .6433821 .9410658
open unemp -.4181323 .0162398 -25.75 0.000 -.4499618 -.3863028
dec88 .0129865 .0776845 0.17 0.867 -.1392723 .1652452
dum90 -.120917 .0368759 -3.28 0.001 -.1931925 -.0486416
dum91 .3069819 .0391053 7.85 0.000 .230337 .3836268
dum92 .7730122 .0497774 15.53 0.000 .6754502 .8705741
dum93 .7087583 .0483907 14.65 0.000 .6139142 .8036024
dum94 .6748439 .0473931 14.24 0.000 .5819551 .7677326
dum95 .6026432 .0476736 12.64 0.000 .5092046 .6960818
dum96 .8445145 .0562596 15.01 0.000 .7342476 .9547813
dum97 1.019143 .0609525 16.72 0.000 .899678 1.138607
dum98 1.429535 .0782065 18.28 0.000 1.276253 1.582817
dum99 2.003936 .0907162 22.09 0.000 1.826135 2.181736
gdpvar -.1811668 .0105262 -17.21 0.000 -.2017977 -.1605358
cons 3.121573 .1198082 26.05 0.000 2.886753 3.356392
quit
gender -.1810372 .0203273 -8.91 0.000 -.2208779 -.1411965
head .1686392 .0272579 6.19 0.000 .1152147 .2220637
age .0284766 .000991 28.73 0.000 .0265342 .030419
educ .0109909 .0058575 1.88 0.061 -.0004895 .0224714
tenure .0117806 .000177 66.55 0.000 .0114336 .0121275
contr. 1.335923 .1015572 13.15 0.000 1.136874 1.534971
open unemp -.2355593 .018598 -12.67 0.000 -.2720108 -.1991078
dec88 -.0553352 .1056273 -0.52 0.600 -.2623609 .1516906
dum90 .0140695 .0379123 0.37 0.711 -.0602373 .0883762
dum91 .306023 .0415871 7.36 0.000 .2245138 .3875322
dum92 .6489914 .0547036 11.86 0.000 .5417743 .7562084
dum93 .6192042 .0538407 11.50 0.000 .5136784 .72473
dum94 .6031951 .0528691 11.41 0.000 .4995735 .7068167
dum95 .6315355 .0540609 11.68 0.000 .525578 .737493
dum96 .9255635 .065104 14.22 0.000 .797962 1.053165
dum97 .8919255 .0697371 12.79 0.000 .7552433 1.028608
dum98 1.280053 .0906129 14.13 0.000 1.102455 1.457651
dum99 1.748608 .103935 16.82 0.000 1.544899 1.952317
gdpvar -.1183126 .0112794 -10.49 0.000 -.1404199 -.0962054
cons 1.759791 .1378228 12.77 0.000 1.489663 2.029919
/athrho -1.347438 .0481393 -27.99 0.000 -1.441789 -1.253086
rho -.8734471 .0114134 -.8940573 -.8491468
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 2681.29 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.9 Bi-Variate Probit Model With Partial Observability (Sector 4)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr. open unemp dec 88 dum 90
dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97 dum98 dum99 gdpvar, partial difficult
from (coefss);
Partial observability bivariate probit Number of obs = 80583
Wald chi2(38) = 4236.43
Log likelihood = -12596.577 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender -.0506884 .0198398 -2.55 0.011 -.0895737 -.011803
head .0826166 .0235618 3.51 0.000 .0364362 .1287969
age .024396 .0008923 27.34 0.000 .022647 .0261449
educ .0120759 .0051745 2.33 0.020 .0019341 .0222178
tenure .0029784 .0001951 15.27 0.000 .0025961 .0033607
contr. .8231948 .0823345 10.00 0.000 .6618222 .9845675
open unemp -.7083143 .020077 -35.28 0.000 -.7476645 -.668964
dec88 -.1011021 .0838245 -1.21 0.228 -.2653952 .063191
dum90 -.1936204 .0387995 -4.99 0.000 -.269666 -.1175748
dum91 .5361646 .0412777 12.99 0.000 .4552619 .6170674
dum92 1.382422 .0576032 24.00 0.000 1.269522 1.495322
dum93 1.391753 .0556437 25.01 0.000 1.282693 1.500812
dum94 1.310186 .0537281 24.39 0.000 1.204881 1.415491
dum95 1.278208 .0543535 23.52 0.000 1.171678 1.384739
dum96 1.75107 .0659743 26.54 0.000 1.621763 1.880378
dum97 2.022718 .0717595 28.19 0.000 1.882071 2.163364
dum98 2.776627 .0944048 29.41 0.000 2.591597 2.961657
dum99 3.707618 .1105368 33.54 0.000 3.49097 3.924266
gdpvar -.2985771 .0163462 -18.27 0.000 -.3306151 -.266539
cons 5.43897 .1457515 37.32 0.000 5.153303 5.724638
quit
gender .045188 .1154914 0.39 0.696 -.1811709 .271547
head .0483844 .1319565 0.37 0.714 -.2102456 .3070145
age .0249699 .0048514 5.15 0.000 .0154613 .0344784
educ .0256673 .0361253 0.71 0.477 -.045137 .0964715
tenure 4.839468 .365562 13.24 0.000 4.122979 5.555956
contr. 4.103745 134.2984 0.03 0.976 -259.1163 267.3238
open unemp 5.015045 .4608656 10.88 0.000 4.111765 5.918325
dec88 -3.49988 134.2985 -0.03 0.979 -266.72 259.7203
dum90 2.350505 .5092575 4.62 0.000 1.352378 3.348631
dum91 -4.094479 .5083757 -8.05 0.000 -5.090877 -3.098081
dum92 -6.55371 .8005341 -8.19 0.000 -8.122728 -4.984692
dum93 -11.55236 1.130583 -10.22 0.000 -13.76826 -9.336453
dum94 -10.96545 1.108345 -9.89 0.000 -13.13777 -8.793136
dum95 -11.53966 1.146819 -10.06 0.000 -13.78738 -9.291937
dum96 -12.21969 1.217345 -10.04 0.000 -14.60565 -9.833743
dum97 -17.24955 1.666793 -10.35 0.000 -20.5164 -13.9827
dum98 -18.06956 1.842026 -9.81 0.000 -21.67987 -14.45926
dum99 -26.13827 2.501743 -10.45 0.000 -31.04159 -21.23494
gdpvar -.5333371 .1683228 -3.17 0.002 -.8632436 -.2034305
cons -90.12394 7.202303 -12.51 0.000 -104.2402 -76.00769
/athrho 205.1497 46.23187 4.44 0.000 114.5369 295.7625
rho 1 0 1 1
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 19.6906 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.10 Bi-Variate Probit Model Supposing Full Observability (Sector 5)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr. open unemp dec 88 dum 90
dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97 dum98 dum99 gdpvar;
Bivariate probit regression Number of obs = 186167
Wald chi2(38) = 26889.63
Log likelihood = -49483.713 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender .0875071 .0125639 6.96 0.000 .0628823 .1121319
head .0461325 .0142416 3.24 0.001 .0182195 .0740454
age .0152634 .0005509 27.71 0.000 .0141836 .0163431
educ .0730478 .0029504 24.76 0.000 .0672652 .0788305
tenure .0094979 .0001568 60.59 0.000 .0091907 .0098052
contr. .6273701 .0487223 12.88 0.000 .5318762 .722864
open unemp -.4728512 .0108887 -43.43 0.000 -.4941927 -.4515097
dec88 .2399117 .0498906 4.81 0.000 .1421279 .3376955
dum90 -.2745807 .0286486 -9.58 0.000 -.3307308 -.2184305
dum91 .1045842 .0269695 3.88 0.000 .051725 .1574434
dum92 .445338 .0324322 13.73 0.000 .3817721 .508904
dum93 .7051495 .0345311 20.42 0.000 .6374697 .7728293
dum94 .6320125 .0334308 18.91 0.000 .5664894 .6975355
dum95 .5277366 .0335192 15.74 0.000 .4620401 .5934331
dum96 .8522529 .0388757 21.92 0.000 .7760579 .9284479
dum97 .969753 .0417931 23.20 0.000 .8878399 1.051666
dum98 1.485022 .0533103 27.86 0.000 1.380535 1.589508
dum99 2.124014 .0615638 34.50 0.000 2.003351 2.244677
gdpvar -.7484837 .9525858 -0.79 0.432 -2.615517 1.11855
cons 3.387921 .0814288 41.61 0.000 3.228324 3.547519
quit
gender -.1426336 .0154037 -9.26 0.000 -.1728243 -.1124429
head .1080326 .0188759 5.72 0.000 .0710364 .1450288
age .0251968 .0007423 33.94 0.000 .0237419 .0266517
educ .0718111 .003818 18.81 0.000 .0643278 .0792943
tenure .0126323 .0002535 49.83 0.000 .0121355 .0131292
contr. 1.134731 .0605985 18.73 0.000 1.01596 1.253502
open unemp -.2591108 .0132973 -19.49 0.000 -.285173 -.2330485
dec88 .1989715 .064184 3.10 0.002 .0731732 .3247697
dum90 -.0506379 .0312949 -1.62 0.106 -.1119748 .0106991
dum91 .2780664 .0301947 9.21 0.000 .2188859 .337247
dum92 .4728483 .037968 12.45 0.000 .3984324 .5472642
dum93 .6324841 .0404372 15.64 0.000 .5532287 .7117396
dum94 .5673132 .038821 14.61 0.000 .4912255 .6434009
dum95 .5191628 .0392642 13.22 0.000 .4422064 .5961191
dum96 .876128 .0470892 18.61 0.000 .7838348 .9684211
dum97 .9797305 .0507952 19.29 0.000 .8801738 1.079287
dum98 1.275958 .0651999 19.57 0.000 1.148168 1.403747
dum99 1.720312 .0761063 22.60 0.000 1.571146 1.869477
gdpvar -12.08746 1.096113 -11.03 0.000 -14.2358 -9.939117
cons 1.707142 .0999568 17.08 0.000 1.51123 1.903053
/athrho -1.312825 .0348786 -37.64 0.000 -1.381185 -1.244464
rho -.8649884 .0087822 -.8812164 -.8467239
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 4847.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A.11 Bi-Variate Probit Model With Partial Observability (Sector 5)
biprobit fire quit gender head age educ tenure contr. open unemp dec 88 dum 90
dum91 dum92 dum93 dum94 dum95 dum96 dum97 dum98 dum99 gdpvar, partial difficult
from coefss);
Partial observability bivariate probit Number of obs=186167
Wald chi2(38) = 22249.94
Log likelihood =-19614.812 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Coeff. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf.Interval]
fire
gender .0252443 .0185739 1.36 0.174 -.0111599 .0616484
head .0737479 .0211777 3.48 0.000 .0322404 .1152554
age .0224392 .0008278 27.11 0.000 .0208166 .0240617
educ .087388 .0043873 19.92 0.000 .0787891 .0959869
tenure .0102169 .000219 46.66 0.000 .0097877 .0106461
contr. .4278629 .0617188 6.93 0.000 .3068963 .5488296
open unemp -3.830774 .0378545 -101.20 0.000 -3.904967 -3.75658
dec88 .69567 .0638978 10.89 0.000 .5704326 .8209073
dum90 .6016875 .0444485 13.54 0.000 .5145701 .6888048
dum91 3.13013 .052137 60.04 0.000 3.027943 3.232316
dum92 7.237571 .079901 90.58 0.000 7.080967 7.394174
dum93 8.485782 .0897859 94.51 0.000 8.309805 8.661759
dum94 7.065091 .0777212 90.90 0.000 6.912761 7.217422
dum95 7.597464 .0864266 87.91 0.000 7.428071 7.766857
dum96 9.765077 .1066981 91.52 0.000 9.555953 9.974202
dum97 10.91536 .1133713 96.28 0.000 10.69316 11.13757
dum98 16.37847 .1696443 96.55 0.000 16.04598 16.71097
dum99 19.19894 .1927019 99.63 0.000 18.82125 19.57663
gdpvar 167.3992 2.901519 57.69 0.000 161.7123 173.0861
cons 26.08786 .2634686 99.02 0.000 25.57147 26.60425
quit
gender .0166432 .0300095 0.55 0.579 -.0421743 .0754606
head .1153864 .0347474 3.32 0.001 .0472828 .18349
age .0209884 .0013314 15.76 0.000 .0183789 .023598
educ .087339 .0070766 12.34 0.000 .0734692 .1012089
tenure .010407 .0003552 29.30 0.000 .0097108 .0111032
contr. .7713329 .1119557 6.89 0.000 .5519037 .9907621
open unemp 8.505176 .1161353 73.24 0.000 8.277555 8.732797
dec88 .3641379 .1161513 3.14 0.002 .1364855 .5917902
dum90 -.4597141 .0645743 -7.12 0.000 -.5862774 -.3331508
dum91 -10.25545 .1501449 -68.30 0.000 -10.54973 -9.961168
dum92 -12.14735 .165538 -73.38 0.000 -12.47179 -11.8229
dum93 -21.21793 .2928022 -72.47 0.000 -21.79181 -20.64405
dum94 -20.0262 .2781965 -71.99 0.000 -20.57146 -19.48095
dum95 -19.45789 .2717187 -71.61 0.000 -19.99045 -18.92533
dum96 -25.1616 .3407653 -73.84 0.000 -25.82949 -24.49371
dum97 -27.72717 .3923401 -70.67 0.000 -28.49614 -26.9582
dum98 -34.13181 .4609936 -74.04 0.000 -35.03534 -33.22828
dum99 -46.73714 .6351597 -73.58 0.000 -47.98203 -45.49225
gdpvar -493.3109 6.814168 -72.39 0.000 -506.6664 -479.9554
cons -51.67976 .717042 -72.07 0.000 -53.08513 -50.27438
/athrho 251.8397 61.676 4.08 0.000 130.9569 372.7224
rho 1 0 1 1
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 16.6731 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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